Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
Volume 20
Issue 2 Winter
Winter 2000

Argentina and the Telecommunications Industry:
The Difficult but Necessary Path Toward
Liberalization
Vanessa P. Rubinstein

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the Communications Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Law and
Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Vanessa P. Rubinstein, Argentina and the Telecommunications Industry: The Difficult but Necessary Path Toward Liberalization, 20
Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 313 (1999-2000)

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

COMMENTS

Argentina and the
Telecommunications Industry: The
Difficult But Necessary Path Toward
Liberalization
Vanessa P. Rubinstein*
I. INTRODUCTION

In the last ten years, Argentina has made tremendous efforts to become
a legitimate and viable economy. Although Argentina has made substantial
progress through its economic reform package, Argentina has still not
achieved the prestige and economic prosperity it seeks. Due to the size of
the telecommunications market and the positive externalities achieved
across many industries, it has become increasingly clear that a well developed telecommunications infrastructure and industry is essential to the economic growth of the country and to achieve prosperity in the twenty-first
century. Yet, Argentina's efforts to modernize its telecommunications infrastructure have achieved mixed results at best. These disappointing results stem primarily from a failure by the government to liberalize
Argentina's telecommunications markets.
To overcome obstacles of economic, political and social instability,
Argentina must meet the challenge of fully liberalizing its telecommunica° J.D. Candidate, May 2000, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to
thank my parents, Silvia Rubinstein and Hector Rubinstein, for their constant support.
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tions. The privatization of the national telecomunications company, Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones ("ENTeL"), demonstrated, in part,
Argentina's initial commitment to liberalize the telecommunications industry. However, while the Argentine government outwardly supported the
liberalization polices, the last decade has revealed the government's hidden
protectionist approach. Argentina's commitment to liberalize is in question
because contradicting legislation works to liberalize and restrict market access simultaneously. While some laws promise to allow competitors to enter the market without restricted access, other resolutions or decrees are
discriminatory in nature and, among other restrictions, create obstacles for
domestic and foreign competitors to penetrate the local market for basic
telephone services.
This article provides a synopsis of Argentina's telecommunications industry and examines the compelling reasons why Argentina must effectively liberalize the industry while eliminating its hidden protectionist
policies. Part II presents a historical overview of the Argentina's telecommunications industry and analyzes Argentina's domestic laws requiring liberalization. Part III explores the main economic policy reasons for why
liberalization of the Argentine telecommunications industry is essential.
Part IV offers recommendations to better achieve effective development,
liberalization and competition in the telecommunications industry. This article concludes that Argentina must completely liberalize its telecommunications industry for basic services, thereby abiding by its domestic legal
commitments and maximizing economic growth.

II. ARGENTINA MUST EFFECTIVELY LIBERALIZE ITS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY TO HONOR ITS LEGAL COMMITMENTS
This Part examines Argentina's legal commitments to the liberalization
of the telecommunications sector. Subpart A describes the government's
privatization of Argentina's telecommunications sector during the 1990s,
which resulted in a market controlled by a duopoly of Argentine companies. Subpart B analyzes Argentina's constitutional jurisprudence, case law
and legislation governing telecommunications liberalization. This Part concludes that while Argentina has made moves to liberalize the telecommunications market for basic services, Argentina has not taken decisive steps
needed to effectively promote competition and access in this industry.
A. Evolution of Argentina's Telecommunications Industry
The evolution of the telecommunications industry is indicative of Argentina's commitment to liberalization on a domestic level. Prior to 1990,
1For the purposes of the paper, the word duopoly will be used interchangeably with monopoly since under either system there is no market competition. A duopoly is simply the
creation of two geographically separated monopolies.
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the telecommunications industry was controlled and operated by ENTeL.
ENTeL was fraught with problems including outdated telecommunications
technology, exorbitant costs, poor telephone services, and incompetent personnel.2 For example, during the 1980s, a potential consumer could wait
between five to ten years before getting access to a telephone and installation costs averaged US$1,500. 3 Given the outdated technology and poor
quality of telephone services, the Argentine government needed to drastically change the operations of the nationally run company.
In 1989, Carlos Menem was elected President of Argentina, and along
with Domingo Cavallo, the economic minister, he developed an economic
reform package. The reform package included the sale of twenty stateowned enterprises, including ENTeL. 4 By privatizing ENTeL, the government hoped to demonopolize 5 and deregulate the telecommunications industry and thereby realize efficiency gains and social benefits for the
public.6
To privatize the telecommunications industry, the Government created
four corporations pursuant to the State Reform Act, also known as Law No.
23.696 and Decree No. 731.7 The newly formed companies were Sociedad
Licenciataria Norte ("SLN"), Sociedad Licenciataria Sur ("SLS"), Sociedad
Prestadora del Servicio Internacional ("SPSI"), and Sociedad de Servicios
en Competencia ("SSEC"). s Under the State Reform Act, the government

2

See

Telecommunications Environment Since 1989

(visited Nov. 1, 1998)
<http://,vwv.secom.gov.ar/html/body evo_modelo.html>. All websites starting with the
identifier "secom" refer to the Argentine National Telecommunications Commission which
regulates, supervises, and controls the delivery of all telecommunications services in Argentina.
3
See
4

id.
See Jose Jr. Tavares de Araujo & Luis Tineo; Harmonizing Competition PoliciesAmong
Mercosur Countries;InternationalCompetition Policy, ANTITRUST BULLETIN, Mar. 1998, at
45,46.
5

"Demonopolization relates to the number of participants or service providers in a determinate activity where the process is generally developed by the government." See Practicing Law in the Americas: The New Hemispheric Reality; Telecommunication Reforms in
the Americas; New Legislation and the Regulatory Framework, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv.

971, 980 (1998) [hereinafter Telecommunications Symposium]. In contrast, "deregulation
focuses on the removal of privileges grants to some market participants as well as the elimination of discriminatory practices." Id. at 982. See also Roberto Dromi, El Mercosury el
Derecho Internacionalde las Telecomunicaciones, in ECONOMiA GLOBILIZADA Y MERCOSUR,
165,6 175 (Ciudad Argentina, 1998).
See The Chosen Modelfor Argentina, supra note 2.
7
See Law No. 23.696, Aug. 8, 1989, B.O. 26702. See Decree No. 731, Sept. 14, 1989,

B.O.8 14/09/89.

See AVELINO ROL6N & CREMASCHIM LOPEZ GABRIELAM, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAWS

iNLATIN AMERICA 1 (1994).
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granted basic services licenses to SLN, SLS, and SPSI a "service in competition" 9 license to SSEC.
President Menem decided to divide the telecommunications industry
for basic services into two sections, separating the market between the
northern and southern part of the country, with each company having access
to half of the Buenos Aires market. SLN was given access to the majority
of the northern region to provide basic telephone services to the urban and
interurban areas.10 SLS was given access to the rest of the areas not given
to SLN." The government gave SPSI the right to provide international basic telephone services, international data, and telex services, leased point-topoint for telephone services, data transmission services, and value-added
services.12 SLS, SLN, and SPSI were granted monopoly privileges lasting
seven to potentially ten years.1 3 The license granted to SSEC allowed it to
and land radio telephone
provide national telex and data, mobile radio
14
services but included no monopoly privileges.
The Argentine government initiated an international bidding process
established by Decree No. 62/90 in 1990,1s resulting in foreign private
companies assuming control of the telecommunications industry. SLN sold
60 percent of its shares to Stet S.p.A of Italy and France Cable et Radio
S.A. (subsequently renamed as Telecom Argentina Stet-France Telecom
S.A. ("Telecom")) and SLS sold 60 percent of its shares to Telef6nica de
16
Espafia, (later renamed Telef6nica de Argentina S.A. ("Telef6nica")).
SPSI became Telintar S.A. and SSEC became Startel S.A. As a result of
the sale, the government endorsed a change in telecommunications policy7
from monopoly at the national level to monopoly at the regional level. 7
The change in telecommunications strategy served to increase investor confidence since more effective and efficient services were expected to follow."
9
The definition of "service in competition" is unclear. However, it does include all telecommunications services not included in the category of basic services. See ROL6N &

GABRIELAM, supra note 8, at 2.
'°See id.

" See id.
12See id.
"'See id.
14See id.

"See Decree No. 62/90, Dec. 1, 1990, B.O. 26.800.

16See Thierry Chaumeil, Regulation and Competition: Licensing Telecommunications
Services in Argentina: the New Legal Framework,35 COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES 163,
164 (1999). See also Stephen Hood & Michael Benster, Legal Issues in InfrastructureFinance; Legal Aspects of Telecommunications Services in Argentina, Brazil, & Columbia,
LATIN FINANCE June 1996, at 62, 63.
17 TelecommunicationsSymposium, supra note 5, at 982.

"'See Michael Flight, Argentina -

Voice Processing Equipment and System, 1997

NATIONAL TRADE BANK MARKET REPORTS,

June 1997, at 1, 2.
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President Menem decided to convert the state-owned monopoly to a
privately held duopoly for various reasons. Selling off the telecommunications industry to two companies allowed the government to create a market
check in which the state could evaluate the performance and progress of
two companies of comparable economic size and market area.19 Comparing
the performances, services offered and technological advancements of each
company allowed the government to determine if any region was being under-serviced. This monitoring feature became an important device since
pure market forces did not drive the market. Although consumers may have
preferred free entry to the market by any competitor, the government believed a duopoly would provide the capital-intensive investments necessary
for the development of the telecommunications market.
The Argentine government granted each company an exclusive sevenyear license for basic services in their respective regions. The seven-year
licenses were supposed to end November 7, 1997.20 As an added incentive,
however, the government also agreed to provide each company with the
option of a three-year extension as long as certain minimum standards for
basic telephone services were met.2 ' These standards included providing
services for areas that previously had no telephone service, meeting target
levels for service quality, market penetration and public and semi-public
services.22 The services covered in the exclusivity agreement also included
"telecommunication[s] services such as data, telex ' and
leased station-to3
station circuits for telephones, and data transmission."
As part of the conditions of the agreement, the government set forth
mandatory goals to be achieved by the telephone companies. Decree No.
62/90, which approved a public auction for the privatization of the telecommunications industry for basic services, also set forth the requirements
for quality, development and growth in the industry. In particular, Sections
10.1.8.1 and 13.5 list mandatory conditions for the auction and authorize
the government to extend the licenses for exclusive control of the basic
services market for2an
4 additional three years as long as the mandatory requirements are met.
Conflicting information exists as to whether the obligatory goals stated
in Decree No. 62/90 were met in order to legally grant the extensions for
Telecom and Telef6nica. In the findings of Decree No. 264/98, the Na-

19See Maria Rosa Villegas Areval & Robert J. Spjut, Telecommunications in Argentina:
Legal Provisions,BANK OF AMERICA'S GUiDE TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS iN LATn, AMERICA
81, 85 (1997).
20
See Decree No. 62/90, supra note 15, art. 13.4.
2
tSee id. art. 13.5.
'See The Chosen Modelfor Argentina,supra note 10.
23See
Villegas Areval & Spjut, supra note 19, at 85.
24
See Decree No. 62/90, supra note 15, arts. 10.1.8.1 & 13.5.
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tional Ombudsman,2 5 the Ombudsman for the City of Buenos Aires,
IMPSAT S.A., 26 Keytech S.A., 27 the province of Neuqu6n and the Consumer Action League all protested the granting of the extension since various requirements were not achieved.28 Notwithstanding these complaints,
the government granted the extension licenses, seemingly endorsing a protectionist policy toward the telecommunications market and turning its back
on prior commitments to liberalization.
Though Argentina has shown progress toward liberalization over the
past ten years, the process remains incomplete. While Argentina did make
the decision to liberalize and privatize the government run monopoly, it has
recently backed away from opportunities to advance the process of liberalization. Even if Argentina did not violate any existing specific legislation
when it granted Telecom and Telef6nica a three-year extension to monopolize the telecommunications industry for basic services, as the next subpart
explains, its actions were arguably unconstitutional. The government also
has the legal authority to accelerate the liberalization of the telecommunications industry.
B. The Argentine Government Has Not Undertaken The Necessary Steps
To Liberalize Its Telecommunications Industry
A legal framework exists in Argentina demanding the liberalization of
the telecommunications industry. This analysis of the Argentine legal system begins with the Argentine Constitution since it carries the most
authoritative weight with respect to domestic obligations and embodies a
strong general policy of promoting a free market economy. Section 1 is divided into two subsections: Subsection (a) describes the pertinent constitutional provisions regarding the area of telecommunications and Subsection
(b) analyzes the contentious issues that arise from applying the constitution
to telecommunications liberalization. Subsequently, Section 2 examines
25,,(l) The Ombudsman is an independent body created within the sphere of the National
Congress operating with full autonomy without receiving instructions from any authority.
The mission of the Ombudsman is the defense and protection of human rights and other
rights, guarantees and interests sheltered under this Constitution and the laws, in the face of
deeds, acts or omissions of the Administration; as well as the control of public administrative
functions.
(2) The Ombudsman has [the] capacity to be a party in a lawsuit. He is appointed and
removed by Congress with the vote of two-thirds of the members present of each House. He
has the immunities and privileges of legislators. He shall hold office for the term of five
years and may only be re-appointed on one occasion.
(3) The organization and operation of this body shall be ruled by a special law."
CONsT. ARG. art. 86 secs. 1, 2, & 3, translated to English, (visited Jan. 22, 2000)
<http:llwwwuniwuerzburgdelawarOOOOO-.htrnl>
26
IMPSAT S.A. is a telecommunications company from the Pescarmona Group.
27
Keytech S.A. is a telecommunications company.
28
See Decree No. 264/98, Mar. 10, 1998, B.O. 13/03/98, findings.
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legislation relevant to the liberalization of the telecommunications industry.
Part B concludes that significant shortcomings exist in the current legislation, which requires more effective liberalization.
1. The Argentine ConstitutionRequires Liberalizationofthe TelecommunicationsIndustry
(a) Constitutional Provisions Affecting Telecommunications
The Argentine constitution sets out the general framework outlining
the laws that govern free market rights, property rights and promotion of
foreign direct investments. Article 42 states that consumers of goods and
services have rights protecting their freedom of choice and economic interests. 29 To the extent that natural30 and legal monopolies exist, the governMoreover, public services, such as
ment must regulate them. 31
require
close
attention
by regulatory entities since it is
telecommunications,
2
a monopoly.
Article 14 provides that all inhabitants of Argentina have the right to
participate in the development of an industry. Furthermore, inhabitants
have the right to buy or sell goods or services. In addition, Article 17 protects property rights of individuals or companies against adverse possession
by the government. The property rights protect, for example, government
contracts, such as licensing agreements.
In addition to the protection granted to inhabitants' rights under Article
14, Article 20 confers foreigners the same civil rights33 given to the Argentine citizens, such as the right to participate in any given industry, business
or profession. 34 Article 16 further complements these provisions by ensuring that all inhabitants receive equal protection under the law. 35 Finally,
29
See
30

CoNsT. ARG. art. 42.
A natural monopoly occurs where the cost of producing each additional unit of a good
or service is constantly declining with respect to consumer demand; to obtain the lowest production costs for consumers, it is necessary to have anti-competitive markets. See THoMAs
G. KRATTENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONs LAW AND

POLICY 344-345 (1998).

In other

words, a natural monopoly arises with certain industries, such as water and telecommunications, as a result of the nature of the infrastructure whereby only one company can develop
the public services in a given area. This natural monopoly lasts only as long as the technological limitations prevent the given industry from being operated in a free market context or
if no3 1ready market substitutes exist.
See CONST. ARG. art. 42.
32
33

See id.

Civil rights are distinguished from political rights to the extent that the former are constitutional protected natural and personal rights whereas the latter refers to the rights to participate in government. See I GERMAN J. BImART CAMPOS, MANUEL DE LA CoNsTuciON
REFOPMADA, 476-488 (1998).
14See CONsr. ARG. art. 20.
35
See CONST. ARG. art. 16.
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Article 75, Section 18 provides that foreign investment must be encouraged,
to which end Congress is allowed to grant the privilege of a temporary monopoly under extraordinary circumstances.36
(b) Issues Arising from Applying Relevant Constitutional Provisions to the
Liberalization of the Telecommunications Industry
The framework of the Argentine Constitution generally supports a free
market economy. Application of many constitutional provisions reveals
that Argentina should liberalize its telecommunications industry. The rights
of consumers protected by Article 42 imply that open competition within
markets is a constitutional requirement in Argentina, otherwise consumers
will be denied the freedom of choice that only competition can ensure.3 7
Article 14 grants inhabitants the.right to pursue a profession in any industry.
Also, inhabitants have the right to participate in commercial activities and
use, sell or donate property in this pursuit. This article, which has not been
amended since its creation in 1853, implies that the framers of the constitution favored a free market economy. Moreover, the absence of a constitutional amendment concerning this article demonstrates the continued
support for a market-oriented economy. The purpose of Article 16 is to
extend equal protection of the law to all inhabitants, which in effect prohibits the government from unduly discriminating in favor of one individual or
entity over another by granting rights to one group and not another. As a
result, potential competitors should be allowed to participate in the telecommunications industry without the government passing discriminatory
legislation in favor of existing competitors. Indirectly, the equal protection
principles provided under Article 16 are reaffirmed in Article 20 for foreigners. Thus, under Article 20, foreigners should be protected from discriminatory legislation that restricts their access to the telecommunications
market as well.
The aforementioned articles of the Argentine Constitution establish a
flexible legal framework to support a free market economy in which competitors can enter the telecommunications industry for basic services. It is
per se unconstitutional for the state to grant monopolies in any industry unless the monopoly is temporary and adequately regulated pursuant to Article 42. Subsection 1 examines the telecommunications industry in 1990 and
1997 to determine if an extraordinary situation existed to justify granting of
the duopoly or subsequent extension. Subsection 2 analyzes the unconstitutionality of not permitting citizen participation in the privatization process.

36
37

See CoNST. ARG. art. 75 sec. 18.
See NIDIA KARINA CICERO, SERVICIOS POBLICOS, CONTROL Y PROTECCI&N 63, 67

(1996).
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(1)

An Extraordinary Situation Existed in 1990 Justifying the Granting
of a Duopoly but not in 1997
An examination of economic and political reasons assists the analysis
as to whether the duopoly granted in 1990 and 1997 were reasonable under
Article 75, Section 18 of the Constitution. In 1990, the telecommunications
industry was extremely under-developed, lacking adequate infrastructure
and up-to-date technology. 38 As a result, the government believed that a
guarantee of some form of a monopoly was needed during the early stages
of development in order to attract foreign companies to invest capital into
the infrastructure of the telecommunications industry. 39 Thus, the government's grant of a duopoly was arguably reasonable due to the outdated
technology, the overall abysmal quality of the telecommunications and,
since the government limited the duopoly to seven years, the satisfaction of
the constitutional requirement of a temporary monopoly under Article 75,
Section 18.
By contrast, the rationale explaining the extraordinary condition in
1990 was no longer applicable in 1997. The telecommunications industry
was sufficiently developed and could have kept up with the rapid technological changes in the industry by allowing regional and world competitors
to enter the market. In fact, the technology available in the telecommunications market was comparable to the similar markets in developed countries.
As a result, whereas in 1990 foreign investors were wary of the Argentine
telecommunications market, many companies were interested in 1997.
Therefore, the rationale for creating a duopoly in 1990 no longer applied
since no inducement was necessary to attract competitors to the Argentine
telecommunications market seven years later.
Although the lack of technology and infrastructure no longer justified
the granting of a duopoly, other factors may have warranted a continuation
of the duopoly as an extraordinary condition. The additional analysis necessary to determine if an extraordinary situation existed in 1997 focuses on
the interpretation of the extension terms of the concession agreements and
responses from other governmental agencies and telephone service users.
This subsequent analysis demonstrates that an extraordinary condition did
not exist in 1997.
First, the terms of the concession agreements gave the government the
option to grant the extension only if obligatory goals were met; the extension was not an automatic right. In Decree No. 264/98, the government
concluded that Telecom and Telef6nica only satisfied a majority of the
obligatory goals. Did completion of most of the obligatory goals comply
with terms of the concession agreement? The language of Section 10.1.8.1
38
39

See TelecommunicationsEnvironment Since 1989, supra note 2.
See El GobiernoDeberiaAbrir Ya El Mercado Telef6nico, ECONOMiA, Sept. 15, 1998,

availablein <http://www.laeconomia.com>.
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of Decree No. 62/90 is ambiguous as to whether all or a majority of the
obligatory goals must be met to qualify for an extension. To resolve this
statutory ambiguity, Argentine jurisprudence advances a method of interpretation which disfavors the party granted the monopoly privilege. 0 In
other words, the government's argument that meeting a majority of the
obligatory factors qualifies Telecom and Telef6nica fails because the statutory language of 62/90 is ambiguous and must be interpreted in a manner
that promotes a free market system in lieu of a monopoly.
Second, since granting the extension was not mandatory, the government had other interpretative options. Judges, consumer associations and
governmental agencies, such as the public defender, strongly believed that
the requirements were not achieved by the telephone companies. 41 Assuming that the objective of the constitution is to protect principles of consumers' rights, the free market, and competition, what better evidence exists
that the government acted incorrectly than the fact that all the consumer associations were fighting against the government and principal competitors,
such as IMPSAT S.A., were seeking judicial action to enter the market? As
discussed in the next section, numerous administrative problems occurred
since the government made a rushed decision and did not act with the necessary transparencies, such as holding public hearings. In total, because
Article 75 Section 18 of the Constitution mandates that granting a monopoly must only occur under extraordinary circumstances, the 1997 extension
appears to be unreasonable.
(2)

The Regulatory Framework Violates the Constitution by not Requiring the Inclusion of Consumer Groups in the Decision-Making
Process
Not only does the constitution require the opening of the telecommunications market, but the regulatory structure used by the government to oversee the current telecommunications duopoly has also been viewed as
unconstitutional. The regulatory framework that controls the competitors in
the telecommunications industry in Argentina is enforced by numerous
government decrees establishing regulatory bodies.42 In 1990, Decree No.
1185/904' established a government agency called the National Communications Commission ("CNC"), which possesses regulatory power over the
entire telecommunications industry except for radio broadcasting. 44 The
CNC's primary regulatory function consisted of issuing licenses, authoriza40

"Dock Sud" CSJN 155 Fallos 12,468 (1929) (Arg.).
Csar Illiano, Todos Los Derechos Reservados, LA NACI6N, Dec. 9, 1998, available
in <http://www.lanacion.com.ar>.
42
See Dromi, supra note 5, at 81.
43See Decree No. 1185/90, June 28, 1990, B.O. 28/06/90.
44See Villegas Areval & Spjut, supra note 19, at 81.
41See
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tions and permits to facilitate telecommunications services. 45 In addition,
the CNC monitors the telecommunications service, approves important
work plans of the licensees to ensure
technical plans and reviews the annual
46
compliance with mandatory goals.
A major limitation of the position of the Secretary of Communications
and CNC, however, is their dependence on the government. The Secretary
of Telecommunications, responsible for creating the CNC enforced telecommunications policy, is a position appointed by the President of Argen48
tina.47 Similarly, the President also appoints the six members of the CNC.
This lack of autonomy in the regulatory enforcement body creates a framework susceptible to pressure from the President.4 9
Moreover, legal scholars and recent case law argue that this regulatory
structure is unconstitutional. Article 42 of the Argentine Constitution states
that regulatory bodies must have some participation by consumer associations.50 Agustin Gordillo, an Argentine legal scholar and authority on administrative law in Argentina, explains that there is a political and legal
necessity to hear the concerns from the public prior to making decisions
which affect consumers or the community.i' Some legal scholars interpret
this as a constitutional requirement that a regulatory body have direct consumer participation.52 Under this view, since the structure of the CNC does
not include this communication and interaction from consumers, it is unconstitutional. Other legal commentators, however, believe that the consumer participation requirement is met by merely holding public hearings.5 3
Nevertheless, even under the more lenient interpretation, the CNC, by failing to make public hearings mandatory, has not upheld its constitutional
duties. Such an issue arose when the CNC undertook a review of whether
45

See id. A company may not provide any type of telecommunications services without
first obtaining a license from the CNT. Furthermore, the CNT has the power to change the
term4 6 of a license in order to adapt to changing market conditions.
COMISI6N NACIONAL DE TELECOMUNICACIONES, PRIVATIZACIONES Y TRANSFORMACI6N

DE LAS TELECOMUNICACIONES,
CION].
47
48
49

14 (1994) [hereinafter

PRIVATIZACIONES Y TRANSFORMA-

See CICERO, supra note 37, at 80.
PRIVATIZACIONES Y TRANSFORMACION, supra note 41, at 13.
See CICERO, supra note 37, at 82.

5°See CONsT. ARG. art. 42. Consumer associations are created to protect consumer interests. Some major goals of consumer associations are the following: to oversee compliance
laws, decrees, and regulations of enforcement authorities, to propose actions to protect consumer interests, to defend consumers against enforcement agencies, private groups or in
court, and to inform consumers concerning relevant market information. B. DAvID JAFFE &
G. ROBERT VAUGHN, SOUTH AMERICAN CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 23 (1996).
5
1AGUSTIN GORDILLO, 2 TRATADO DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO, ch. 10 at 3 (2d ed.).
52
See generally JORGE Luis SALOMONI, TEORIA GENERAL DE LOS SERVICIOS POBLICOS

400 (Villela, ed. 1999).

5 See GORDILLO, supranote 51.
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Telecom and Telef6nica had fulfilled requirements for a three year extension of their duopoly.
2. Argentine Legislation,Resolutions, Decrees and Case Law Governing
the Liberalizationof the TelecommunicationsIndustry
Aside from the constitutional provisions espousing the promotion of
competitive industries, the Argentine Congress passed a number of laws
governing the telecommunications industry. Law No. 19.798 4 enacted in
1972 ("Telecommunications Law"), the State Reform Act and subsequent
decrees 55 have contributed to the process of liberalization by facilitating the
transition from a protectionist to a competitive telecommunications industry. The passage of the State Reform Act in 1989 started the government's
transition to a free market system. This law authorized the privatization of
ENTeL and was immediately followed by Decree No. 731/89 and modified
by Decree No. 59/9056 to establish the general guidelines for the privatization process.5 7
On a more recent level, Decree No. 264/98 established a transitional
plan for the liberalization of the telecommunications services governing the
November 1997 to 2000 time period. Then, following the completion of
the exclusivity extensions, Law No. 25.00058 and Resolution No. 16.20059
set forth established rules regulating a liberalized market after November
2000.
(a) Telecommunications Legislation Regulating the November 1997 - 2000
Time Period
On March 1998, the President issued Decree No. 264/98, ostensibly in
an attempt to liberalize the telecommunications market at the end of the exclusivity period. The effect of the decree, however, was to extend the preexisting duopoly. Even though obligatory goals were not met under the
concession agreement, President Menem justified the granting of the extensions since a majority of the goals were accomplished.60 Despite complaints from various consumer associations and individuals regarding the
extensions of the exclusive licenses, Menem proceeded to enact this decree
54Article 4 of the Telecommunications Law No. 19.798 of 1972 establishes that it is a
Federal Executive Power to grant licenses to third parties, (different than state-run parties)
with a precarious status, to install and provide telecommunications services. See Law No.
23, 1972, B.O. 23/8/72.
19.798,
55 Aug.
See Hood & Benster, supra note 16, at 62.
56
See Decree No. 59/90, Jan. 1, 1990, B.O. 26800.
57
pRIVAnZACIONES Y TRANSFORMACIRN, supra note 46, at 9.
58
See Law No. 25.000, July 27, 1998, B.O. 7/27/98. Law No. 25.000 incorporates into
Argentine law the fourth protocol annex to the General Agreement on Trade of Services.
59
See Resolution No. 16.200, June 23, 1999, B.O. 29172.
60
See Decree No. 264/98, supra note 28.
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even though an important case at the appellate federal court level, Martin
Youssefian v. Secretaria de Comunicaciones,61 which could significantly
undermine the validity of the decree, was still pending.62
If one assumes that the exclusivity extensions were legitimately
granted, Decree No. 264/98 is a positive step towards the liberalization of
the telecommunications industry. However, shortcomings in the language
of the decree serve to heighten rather than remove barriers to entry. The
strength of Decree No. 264/98 is that it provides a transition plan for the
liberalization of the telecommunications industry during November 1997 to
2000. Article 1 of Decree No. 264/98 declares that licenses shall be granted
in the telecommunications industry for basic telephone services beginning
on November 8, 1999.63 Article 5 and 6 set forth the license requirements
for basic phone telecommunications services. Licenses will be granted to
two new operators for local, long distance and international telecommunications services by November 8, 1999. Thus, a general and fairly comprehensive framework is established to grant competitors the licenses required
to compete in the market in November 2000.
The goal to liberalize the telecommunications market by allowing
competitors access 7to the market fails, however, because of various restrictive provisions in Decree No. 264/98. 64 For instance, Article 5 states
various requirements that limit the scope of potential operators, such as the
condition that new licensees must be corporations "whose shareholders
must include a current operator of mobile tele[communications] services, a
cable TV company operating in the major cities of Argentina and Independ'' 65
ent Operators of telephone services, a.k.a. the 'telephone cooperatives.
As a result, the language of Decree No. 264/98 is under-inclusive. CTI and
Movicom are the only new companies that qualify for the licenses. 66 Evidence of the continuance of a protectionist policy is confirmed by many
potential competitors that filed suit against the government challenging Decree No. 264/98. For example, IMPSAT S.A., a potential competitor for
basic telecommunications services, filed suit against the Argentine government requesting an executive order to repeal Decree No. 264/98 since it was
denied market entry.67 Keytech, S.A., another possible competitor filed a
complaint about the governmental barriers to entry imposed by Decree No.
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See infra Part II.B.2.b.(1).
See infra Part II.B.2.b.(2).
63
See Decree No. 264/98, supra note 28 art. 1.
6See
CICERO, supra note 36, at 5.
65
See Decree No. 264/98, supra note 28 art. 5.
66See
Illiano, supra note 37. See also Chaumeil, supra note 16, at 165.
67
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See El Impsat, En ContraDel Monopolio Telef6nico, ECONOMiA, Sept. 18, 1998 available in <http://www.laeconomia.com>.
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reinforcing the argument that the government has hedged its liberalization goal by including protectionist provisions.
In addition to limiting access to the field of potential competitors, the
restrictions of Decree No. 264/98 also violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Argentine Constitution. Contravening Article 14, competitors are inhabitants
of the country and are being denied the right to participate in the telecommunications industry. In violation of Article 16, potential competitors are
not given equal protection under law because the restrictive terms create
barriers to market entry. Thus, the aforementioned constitutional violations
are compelling evidence that prove that certain provisions of Decree No.
264/98 are unduly restrictive and that the government supports a partially
protectionist telecommunications policy.
(b) Case Law Analysis Revealing Protectionism in the Telecommunications Policy
(1)

Description of the Youssefian case
Despite government claims to the contrary, an overview of the procedural history of the Youssefian case reveals the government's protectionist
policy regarding the liberalization of the telecommunications industry. At
both a trial and appellate court level, Youssefian, a user of telephone services, requested a public hearing 69 because the government planned to make
a decision significantly impacting consumers social welfare regarding a national public service. The main issue was whether the government was required to hold a public hearing prior to granting an extension of the
exclusivity Licenses for Basic Telephone Services. The appellate court
used the equitable remedy of a preliminary injunction ° to stop the government from granting the exclusivity extension until the substantive issue of
the case could be resolved. In the final ruling, one trial court judge and
three appellate court judges ruled unanimously in favor of the consumer,
holding that that the government must have some form of consumer participation, such as a public hearing, prior to granting the exclusivity extension.
The appellate court reasoned that the Secretary of Communications
breached its legal duty to hold a public hearing to discuss the possible extension of the exclusivity period. The court found two sources of authority
61

See Complaint filed by the President of Keytech S.A., Norberto 0. Alvarez, (visited

April
69 10, 2000) <http://www.secom.gov.ar/resol/r 98 1250_ktech.html>.

A public hearing is a forum which permits all telephone service users and interested
parties an opportunity to participate in a debate to express their concerns and complaints
concerning the telecommunications services prior to the making of a governmental decision
that70may effect the telephone user's rights. GoRDILLo, supra note 51, at 11-13.
The injunction was granted since the mere omission of allowing the consumer to participate in a public hearing was a sufficient harm to Youssefian's rights. GORDILLO, supra
note 51, at 8.
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for its ruling. First, the legal requirement to hold public hearings in the
telecommunications industry is mandated by Article 30 of Decree No.
1185/90. In addition, the court relied upon article 42 of the Constitution,
which provides that entities regulating public services require consumer
participation. 71 Despite the appellate court ruling on June 23, 1998, the
government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court and the case has
not yet been decided as of January, 2000.
Protectionist Implications from Decree No. 264/98 and the Youssefian case
The provisions of Decree No. 264/98 demonstrate the strategic tactics
of the government to refrain from complete liberalization of the telecommunications industry. According to Article 23, Decree No. 264/98 is effective, however, to the resolution of the Youssefian case and the "procedural
impediments" (which means equitable remedies such as injunctions). 72 In
effect, Article 23 permits the President to issue a decree which sets up the
conditions liberalizing the telecommunications industry during the exclusivity extension period and implicitly endorses the validity of the exclusivity extensions since licenses for basic services were not granted until
October-November 1999. One may argue that the government was not
acting in a protectionist manner but was attempting to reach a compromise
between the consumer's goals and Telecom and Telef6nica by reducing the
exclusivity extension from three years granted by Decree No. 62/90 to two
years under Decree No. 264/98. This argument fails since Resolution No.
16.200/99 restricts new licensees from entering the market until November
8, 2000, so in effect the exclusivity extension is not shortened.73 Even if the
eventual outcome of the Youssefian case supercedes Decree No. 264/98, the
government's strategy to prolong the duopoly becomes effective because
the longer it takes the Supreme Court to adjudicate the case, the longer
competitors are prevented from entering the market. Even if the Youssefian
case is heard tomorrow, January 29, 2000, and ruled in favor of the consumer and the extensions are determined to be invalid, Telecom and Telef6nica still benefited from the duopoly for an additional two years. Thus,
the government's protectionist strategy is realized through conditions set
forth in Decree No. 264/98.
In addition to the terms of Decree No. 264/98, the procedural history of
the Youssefian case reflects the reluctance of the government to allow competitors to enter the market at the end of the exclusivity period. Despite the
courts' valid holding and reasoning, the government selected a procedural
maneuver by appealing two times so that the cases would not become
(2)

71

"Youssefian," CNFed. 178 E.D. 793 (1998) (Arg.).
Decree No. 264/98, supra note 28 art. 23.
73
See Resolution No. 16.200, supra note 59 art. 3.
72See
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binding, meaning that the case would not supercede the validity of the Decree No. 264/98. That the government's appeal from the appellate courts
decision on June 23, 1998 has not been heard as of January 2000 is perhaps
not surprising. Whereas Administrative Law Appellate Court N. 4 is recognized as being one of the most independent administrative law courts in
the country, the Supreme Court appears more susceptible to political pressure since Menem appointed all of the justices. 74 Thus, the government's
goal of freezing the case has been accomplished because the Supreme Court
has not begun any hearings since the appeal, over one and a half years ago.
The delay in hearing the case is beneficial to the government for two
reasons. First, administrative law declares acts invalid which do not adhere
to the prescribed administrative procedure or laws. 75 In other words, a monopoly extension for which the government does not follow its administrative procedural requirements (i.e. holding public hearings) demands a return
to a free market system.76 Applying this concept, the act of the government
granting the extension to Telecom and Telef6nica becomes null and void if
the Supreme Court holds that the government did not meet its constitutional
obligation of incorporating consumer participation in the decision-making
process. As a result, the government benefits by delaying the case and
prolonging the duopoly in case the extension is determined to be inoperative. Second, if the Supreme Court postpones the adjudication of the case,
the issue in the case will become moot in less then ten months since the exclusivity extension period will end November 2000. Once again, the government has prolonged the extension despite its constitutional violations.
Thus, the government strategically chose to appeal the legally valid and
binding case in hopes of avoiding its constitutional obligation of having
consumer participation prior to the granting of the exclusivity extension.
In conclusion, the government purposely granted the extensions in lieu
of conducting the extension analysis under more transparent procedures,
such as by holding a public hearing. Furthermore, the strategies implemented in the Youssefian case reveal and the provisions of Decree No.
264/98 demonstrate that the government had an opportunity to accelerate
the liberalization process in 1997 and failed to do so. As consumer participation, such as public hearings was not considered on this issue, the granting of the extension was illegal under this interpretation of article 42. 7
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See generally HoRAcio VERBITSKY, HACER LA CORTE (1993).

See GOIWiLLO, supra note 51, at 2 fn.1-2.
See id. at ch. 6, p. 8.
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The underlying rationale for this constitutional guaranty is to protect consumer rights
so that their interests are considered and evaluated prior to the government deciding significant issues which significantly impact social conditions, as in the telecommunications industry. See GORDILLO, supra note 5 1.
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(c) The Guidelines Set Forth in a Resolution Undermine the Recent Legislation Promising Full Liberalization
In contrast to the disappointing government protectionist policies in
1997, more recent legislation affecting the telecommunications market in
the year 2000 and beyond appears somewhat more promising. On July 22,
1998, the Argentine government passed Law No. 25.000, whereby Argentina promises to take specified measures to open the telecommunications
services to competition. As a whole, Law No. 25.000 vows not to impose
barriers to entry on access to the market and national long-distance service
among other things.7 9 Though it remains to be seen if the government will

enforce Law No. 25.000, it appears to be a reasonable attempt to liberalize
the telecommunications market in most areas.
In executing a liberalized telecommunications policy, the Secretary of
Communications issued Resolution No. 16.200/99, which describes specific
guidelines for new entrants in the telecommunications industry beginning
November 8, 2000, thereby implementing several laws, including Law No.
25.000. Resolution No. 16.200/99 imposes obstacles, thus dampening enthusiasm for the recent legislation. A potential competitor must meet certain conditions and requirements listed in Article 6 of Resolution No.
16.200 in order to obtain a license. For example, a competitor is required to
have net assets greater than US$100,000,000 to obtain a general license, a
foreign competitor must include capital from a local Argentine partner that
has a direct or indirect holding of at least 10 percent and "the obligation to
sign an agreement with the State of Argentina." 80 These conditions impose
entry obstacles for some potential competitors and new entrants.81
In addition to being disappointingly protectionist, the requirements in
Article 6 of Resolution No. 16.200 appear to violate Argentina's commitments to the World Trade Organization (CWTO") and Argentine laws meant
to defend and attract foreign investors. Violations of international agreements are serious because they constitute violations of both international
and domestic law. The Argentine Parliament specifically passed two laws
enacting international commitments made to the WTO into national laws.82
First, on a general level, Law No. 25.000 states that the access to the market
for local, long distance, national and international services will be unrestricted as of November 8, 2000. It is important to note that Law No.
21.38283 specifically contradicts some of the conditions required in Article
6 of Resolution No. 16.200 since it states that foreign companies do not
78

See Law No. 25.000, supra note 58. See also Chaumeil, supra note 15, at 166.
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See supranote 74.
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See Resolution No. 16.200, supra note 59 art. 5.
See Chaumeil, supra note 16, at 177.
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1 See id. at 178.
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have an obligation to seek capital from and a partnership with a local Argentine party. Second, pursuant to Law No. 24.425,84 Argentina approved
the Final Act of the Uruguay Round Agreements which incorporate the
WTO's undertaking of activities, such as multilateral commercial negotiations, decisions, declarations, ministerial understandings and the Marrakesh
agreement.8s Under Law No. 24.425, Argentina specifically committed to
the WTO to prohibit restrictions on the access to the telecommunications
services market and its local treatment.86 This specific commitment, which
became Argentine national law, requires liberalization of the telecommunications industry. Thus, Law No. 24.425 also contradicts the entry guidelines imposed by Article 6 of Resolution No. 16.200.
The 1994 amendment to the Constitution established the supremacy of
treaties to national laws or resolutions in Article 75, Section 22.87 Thus, the
supremacy clause preempts the National Congress or any governmental
province from implementing laws or resolutions that contradict the text or
intent of a treaty." As a result, Resolution No. 16.200 is invalid since, in
addition to Law No. 21.382, it violates Argentina's commitments to the
WTO to allow competitors open access to the telecommunications market
for basic services free of any government imposed barriers. In an effort to
promote foreign capital, the Congress passed Law No. 21.382, which regulates foreign investments in Argentina, stating that foreign companies are
not subject to any requirement to opening up a business with a local partner.8 9 This law provides that foreign and local investments receive the same
protection. 9°
In sum, Argentina has made progress by enacting legislation regulating
the liberalization of the telecommunications industry as of November 2000.
Nevertheless, it is too early to determine if Argentina will abide by its domestic and international legal commitments to liberalization. On the positive end, as of December 12, 1999, the government has granted nine
licenses for Local Basic Telephone Services to nine different companies,
allowing the companies to officially enter the market and compete as of
August 11, 2000. Despite these new licenses, Argentina has repeatedly
84

See Law No. 24A25, Jan. 5, 1995, B.O. 05/01/95.
See Dromi, supranote 5, at 168.
86 See Chaumeil, supranote 16, at 178.
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See CONsT. ARG. art. 31.
88 A related issue regarding the discussion of preemption is whether since all privatizations are carried out pursuant to provincial laws, the adoption of clauses in contradicting a
treaty would be preempted. See Dromi, supra note 5, at 81.
89
See Chaumeil, supra note 16, at 178.
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9°See id.

9
1The following resolutions were passed, granting nine companies licenses to compete in
the market for basic services. IMPSAT, S.A., S.C. 19196199, Compaiiia Del Sur, S.A., S.C.
1357/99, Telnet S.A., S.C.1412/99, Metrored Telecomunicaciones S.A., S.C. 2810/99, Superfone S.A., S.C. 3078/99, Diginet Argentina S.A., S.C. 3203/99, Ferro Cablemundo Co-
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missed opportunities to effectively open the market and continue some level
of protectionism. Resolution No. 16.2000 highlights this point since, instead of truly opening the door to all competitors on a non-discriminatory
basis, the legislation creates burdensome obstacles for foreigners to penetrate the local Argentine telecommunications market.
III. POLICY REASONS ARGENTINA MUST LIBERALIZE ITS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY

This Part explores the policy reasons that the Argentine government
should liberalize its telecommunications industry. Subpart A analyzes Argentina's strong economic incentive to promote activities that lead to the
growth and development of the country, including trade with foreign countries. Argentina has an economic interest in pursuing a liberalization policy
since such a policy facilitates the advancement of the telecommunications
industry and creates positive externalities to other industries. Subpart B
presents Argentina's political commitments to international organizations to
support, on varying levels, the implementation and effectuation of a free
market system, especially in traditionally protected areas such as telecommunications. This Part concludes that Argentina must liberalize its telecommunications industry in order to maximize opportunities for economic
growth and development.
A. Liberalization of the Telecommunications Industry is Critical to the
Economic Development and Growth of Argentina
A number of economic benefits are achieved through the liberalization
of the telecommunications industry. First, liberalization leads to the development of services, infrastructure and technology within the telecommunications industry and enables Argentina to remain competitive in the
international marketplace. 92 Second, liberalization of the telecommunications industry fosters the growth and expansion of other industries and
overall economic development in Argentina.9 3 Third, liberalization of the
telecommunications industry will positively impact the development of international
trade and economic growth in Argentina and the Mercosur re94
gion.
First, liberalization leads to a well-developed telecommunications industry. The theory of trade liberalization postulates that the environment
municaciones S.A., S.C. 3928/99, Federaci6n de Cooperativas de Telecomunicaciones
(FECOTEL), S.C. 4270/99, NSS S.A., S.C. 4166/99.
92
See Stephen Miller & David Hudson, Communications Technologies and Their Implicationsfor Latin America, in BANK OF AMERICA'S GUIDE TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN LATIN
AMERICA 21, 37 (1997).
93
See Pekka Tarianne, Americas Geopolitical Challenges: Trade in Telecom Services
(visited Sept. 3, 1998)<http://www.itulspeeches/1996/tajanne/rio/riol_100696.htm>.
94
See id.
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created by exposing domestic firms to international competitors will serve
to induce lower prices and prompt higher quality goods and services. 95 Applying this theory on an industry specific basis, telecommunications liberalization becomes a conduit for growth since it fosters increased
competition resulting in advanced technology, better services and greater
infrastructures.9 6 This expansion is explained in part by the idea that greater
information will be acquired as communication between companies improves, thereby facilitating the development of business opportunities.
Statistical evidence demonstrates the benefits of liberalization achieved
in the telecommunications industry. The development of the telecommunications infrastructure has greatly expanded considering that Argentina's
capital investments for basic telephone services increased from US$371
million in 1992 to US$2,445 million in 1995. 97 A specific indicator reflecting the development of the telecommunications industry infrastructure
is the number of telephone lines installed. In 1991, Telecom and Telef6nica
installed a total of 241,393 new lines. 98 By contrast, both companies added
727,271 new lines in 1995, representing a per annum increase of 40 percent.99 Also, from 1983 to 1998, the telecommunications market for new
products and services multiplied seven times.1°° Finally, the average number of days to fix a telephone line improved significantly. A telephone user
of Telecom had to wait an average of 30 days in 1990, compared to three
days in 1996; similarly, a consumer of Telef6nica waited an average of 16
days in 1990, compared to just a single day in 1994.101 As a whole, these
statistics reflect the improved services and infrastructure achieved as a result of liberalization. A developing country, such as Argentina, should
avoid the problem of having a technologically deficient industry, a serious
problem endured throughout Argentina's history. To avoid these problems
of the past, Argentina's liberalization program thus enables its telecommunications industry to keep pace with the rapid technological advancements
achieved by competitors in the global marketplace. 10 2 Thus, an open market
strategy continues to provide Argentina access to the almost daily technological advancements made in the telecommunications industry.
95
96

See Tavares de Araujo & Tineo, supra note 4, at 46.

See Richard Simonson, Telecommunications in Latin America, in BANK OF AMERICA'S
GUIDE TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 3 (1997).
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NATIONAL TRADE BANK MARKET REPORTS, Apr. 1997, at 1, 13.
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See COMISI6N NACIONAL DE COMUNICACIONES, DATOS OPERATIVOS Y ESTADISTICOs,

at
24 (1996).
99See id.
1'°See Evolution of the Telecommunications Market (visited Nov. 1, 1998)
<http://www.secom.gov.ar/htmllb odyevotelefonia.html>.

'0 1DATOS OPERATIVOS Y ESTADISTICOS, supra note 98, at 34.

'02 See Key Risk Factors: Credit Assessment, in BANK OF AMERICA'S GUIDE TO
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA 47,50 (1997).
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Second, the liberalization of the Argentine telecommunications industry leads to the growth and expansion of other industries and is a fundamental component of a country's overall economic development. 0 3 The
modernization and development of the telecommunications industry produces positive externalities by supporting the growth of other industries;
this phenomenon occurs since telecommunications is an essential vehicle
contributing to the birth and expansion of other industries.1°4 On a national
level, economic growth is impeded and investment by governmental and
private sector is disadvantaged without access to modem telecommunications technology. 10 5 Advanced communication systems and competitive
telecommunications costs facilitate the creation of new businesses. As a result of this recommended liberalization, the monetary investment in this
telecommunications industry will support the technological advancement
and infrastructure of the telecommunications industry.
Third, telecommunications liberalization leads to decreased communications costs which in turn leads to increased cross-border trade for Argentina between Mercosur members and Chile. The rationale is that the
development of communication links between neighboring countries promotes an increase in cross-border trade. 10 6 An extensive international
communication system will probably only be established if the costs are
low enough to justify such actions. One important factor facilitating international trade is the close proximity of bordering countries helping to
maintain relatively low costs for cross-border transactions. 0 7 However,
proximity alone will not maximize a reduction in telecommunications costs.
Rather, an open market in the telecommunications industry will also assist
the reductions in costs.'08
Another benefit from a telecommunications policy of liberalization is
the transfer of information, which may also lead to increased trade. Regional development depends on the inexpensive communication costs to facilitate the exchange of information. 109
Greater investment in
telecommunications infrastructure and lower costs for companies to gain

10 3 See Henry Chasia, The Role of Telecommunications in Globalization and Regional

Integration (visited Sept. 3, 1998) <http:llwww.itu.intlspeechesl1997/spl9/speechl9.htm>
1'4See Communications in Mercosur Inexorable Advancement of Successful Advance-

ment,
Argentime, Sept. 1998, at 18. See also Dromi, supra note 5, at 167.
05

1 See Raul L. Katz & Alexander Dichter, DecentralizingTelecommunications in Latin

America, STRATEGY & Bushnss REPRINT, Winter 1997, at 2, 7.
6 See id. at 6.

'07 See id.

108The goal for companies is to keep telecommunications costs at about 4 percent of total
operating costs, resulting in exporting companies establishing more communications links
with neighboring countries. See id.
1°9See id.
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access to this infrastructure will lead to more growth in the bilateral trade. 1
A developed telecommunications industry supports the inter-regional trade
of goods and services and, thus, promotes regional integration and
growth.' Thus, as bordering countries' communication costs decrease, so
will the barriers preventing or discouraging the exchange of
goods, serv12
ices, and information, thereby facilitating cross-border trade.'
B. Argentina's International Commitments to World Organizations Support
the Liberalization of its Telecommunications Industry

For policy reasons, Argentina must abide by its international
commitments to remove the obstacles and barriers to entry in its telecommunication industry. Argentina should honor its international
commitments to the WTO 113 and the International Telecommunications Union ("ITU") 14 to improve Argentina's credibility and integrity as a country that follows through on its commitments.
Otherwise, a pattern of dishonoring international commitments may
weaken Argentina's credibility in the international arena and may
jeopardize business opportunities and economic growth, in addition
to violating domestic legal obligations to follow through on its international commitments to these organizations. Thus, it is in Argentina's interest to abide by its international commitment since
international investors are more apt to invest in a country and region
that is in the process of establishing a well-developed and liberalized
telecommunications industry.
Upholding one's international commitments is extremely important since it increases investor confidence, improves foreign direct
investment and distinguishes Argentina from other Latin American
" 0This increased trade with bordering countries is evidenced by the rate of growth of
international traffic between the Mercosur members which has risen from 10 percent during
1990-1992 to 25 percent during 1992-1994. See Tarjanne, supra note 93.
111

See Chasia, supra note 96.
id.

12 See

" 3 The WTO is a judicial entity whereby its members conferred this regulatory power
pursuant to the Marrakesh Agreement. See Dromi, supra note 18, at 166. The WTO's goals
are to promote fair trade through regulation, encourage freer trade by the lowering of trade
barriers and to eliminate anti-competitive practices. These goals are established in conjunction with the World Bank, and are intended to achieve clear and coherent political and economic policies on a worldwide basis. See id.
14 The ITU is the preeminent body for regulating the international the telecommunications industry. It is, in fact, the only organization with a "mandate to oversee global tele-

communications."
Alexandra M. Field, 1NTELSAT at a Crossroads; International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization, 25 LAW & POL'Y OF INT'L Bus. 1335, 1337

(1994). The ITU is a "specialized agency of the United Nations whose members are national
governments." Id. See also Dromi, supra note 5, at 168. The ITU's mission is to promote
the mobilization of human and financial capital in order to develop the infrastructure and
technology of the world-wide telecommunications industry. Id. at 170.
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countries that do not respect international obligations. Argentina presented the WTO with a list of commitments to develop and deregulate its telecommunications industry. Moreover, Argentina promised
to allow competitors open access to the telecommunications market
for basic services as of November 2000, so any anti-competitive
1 15
measures would serve to violate this commitment on a broad level.
Argentina's international pledge sent and continues to provide a
strong signal to the world regarding its commitment to the development of the telecommunications industry, striving for the highest
quality service at the most efficient prices. 16 In addition, Argentina
has made commitments to the ITU to follow their standards of free
competition in the telecommunications industry for basic services and
technological recommendations.
In sum, honoring these commitments to liberalize the telecommunications industry will aid Argentina for important economic policy reasons.
Argentina will be able to build stable relationships with foreign countries
that will support the inflow of capital, which in turn will lead to further
strengthening of foreign relations and even greater capital inflows as Argentina earns international respect as a nation committed to free trade.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Argentina should create, and most importantly enforce, a concrete plan
to deregulate the telecommunications industry for basic services. Although,
Telecom and Telef6nica's exclusive licenses expire in November 2000, Argentina must still enact competitive safeguards ' 7 and legislation to assure
the international business community that the telecommunications industry
will indeed be deregulated. A more detailed plan should be created explaining the specific steps in deregulating the telecommunications industry
and minimizing barriers to entry for competitors. The following three recommendations outline several actions that the Argentine government should
take in order to develop the telecommunications industry, promote competition and increase foreign direct investment.

15 WORLD TELECOM PACr-SuMMARY OF COMMITMENTS, reprinted in LIBERALIZATION
OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS: A WORLD OF OPPORTUNITY, at 10 (ABA 1997).

116See Argentina Vows Commitment to Basic Telecommunications, ARGENTIME, Sept.
1998,7 at 19.
11 Competitive safeguards are measures implemented to prevent "employment of noncompetitive practices, such as cross-subsidization, the use of information for noncompetitive practice ends or suppression of information, among other factors." See Argentina Vows Commitment to Basic Telecommunications,ARGENTIME, Sept. 1998, at 19.
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A. The National Communications Commission Should Be An
Independently Run Agency With the Autonomy To Regulate The
Telecommunications Industry
The objectives of Argentine regulatory agencies are to ensure competition in markets and regulate the activities of government-sanctioned monopolies. Regulatory authorities accomplish these objectives by protecting
consumer rights, monitoring the performance of contractual obligations and
regulatory guidelines, promoting the expansion of industries and increasing
the number of consumers, and controlling the quality of services.118 Accomplishing these goals, in turn, promotes and assists the development of a
competitive environment in the telecommunications industry. However, it
is highly unlikely that these objectives can be attained without the CNC
being autonomous. In other words, to operate effectively and efficiently,
the CNC must run as an independent agency, protected against direct influences of the executive branch and the companies it regulates.
First, the CNC must be independent from political influences. 119 The
legitimacy of the regulatory entity is jeopardized if it receives orders or direction regarding its functions from outside political forces. 120 To prevent
outside influence, financial funding must be guaranteed separate from the
decisions or actions of the regulatory body. 121 Second, the regulatory body
1 22
must be isolated from pressures exerted by the companies it regulates.
To realize this goal, professionals selected to fill the positions of the CNC
must have the requisite knowledge, technical understanding and independence from political parties and private entities.' z The selection process
must be transparent to avoid the dangers of appointing friends of the President who are more likely to lend political favors and support. 124 In addition,
mechanisms must be in place to incorporate consumer participation in the
selection process.
Regrettably, since the onset of the privatization of the telecommunications industry in 1990, the CNC has been and continues to be susceptible to
the undue influence and pressure from the executive branch. The Argentine
President appoints the President of the CNC and the five other members of
the commission without congressional approval and participation from con-

8

1

See CICERO, supra note 37, at 76. See generally GORDrLLo supra note 47, ch 6 at 12-

16.
1190 See GORDILLO supra note 51.
12 See id.
121 See id.

'2See id.
See id.
24
' See id.
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sumer associations. 25 The term is for five years with the option of reappointment for one additional term.
By contrast, in the U.S., the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"), the equivalent to the Argentina's CNC, has several mechanisms to
preserve the independence of the regulatory body. While the President of
the U.S. appoints the five Commissioners of the FCC, the Senate must also
confirm these positions. In addition, a maximum of three Commissioners
may represent the same political party and none may have a financial interest inFCC related business.126 Finally, the term of the FCC's President is
limited to a five-year term, except when filling an un-expired term. 127 This
structure protects the authenticity of the regulatory entity so that it can perform its essential functions. Argentina should enact similar mechanisms to
maintain the independence of the CNC, such as requiring congressional approval of the President and the other members of the CNC.
B. Create a Strong Regional Organization to Develop and Coordinate
Liberalized Telecommunications Policy for Argentina and the other
Mercosur Members
Argentina should work along with Mercosur members to integrate their
telecommunication industries. For various reasons, a country is most easily
able to trade with its neighbors due, in part, to reduced transaction costs.
As the prestige and power of Mercosur increases, it will in turn look to Argentina to purchase more goods resulting in business and economic development for Argentina. Also, Argentina should develop a strong regional
plan with Mercosur because it provides Argentina access to an expanded
and growing market 128 representing a population of more than 240 million
Virtually all
President
the
For
example,
President.
by
the
appointed
members of regulatory agencies are
appoints: five positions - along with communications with the previous Congress - to the
Ente Nacional Regulador del Gas, ("ENARGAS"), four positions to the Comisi6n Nacional
de Correos y Tel~grafos, ("CNCT,"), three positions to the Comisi6n Nacional de Transported Ferroviario, ("CNTF"), and three positions to the Comisi6n Nacional de Transporte
("CoNTA"). See CICERO, supra note 36, at 80.
de Automotor
126See
Federal Communications Commission (visited Jan. 15, 2000)
<http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html>.
125In Argentina, the majority of regulatory bodies lacks independence.

' 27
See id.
28

1 To quantify the importance of the telecommunications industry to the economy of
Latin America, the ITU estimated that, as a whole, developing countries in Latin America
needed to invest US$466 billion from 1993 to 2000 in order to keep pace with growth projections. See Tarjanne, supra note 93. As business communities and populations in Latin
America grow, ITU estimated that Latin America's percentage of the global market for telecommunication services will increase from 6 percent in 1995 to 10 percent by 2000. See
Miller & Hudson, supra note 92, at 21, 37. For Argentina to take advantage of the sizable
growth potential of the telecommunications market, the government should liberalize the
telecommunications industry to continue to attract foreign capital flows.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

20:313 (2000)

people. Thus, the growth and prestige of the Mercosur region will subsequently lead to economic expansion in Argentina.
Argentina should participate with the other Mercosur members in creating a strong regional organization to establish and coordinate a telecommunications policy that opens regional competition for basic telephone
services.1 9 This policy will consolidate regional interests and will assist
the implementation of international standards and recommendations on a
regional and sub-regional basis.130 Furthermore, coordinated policies at the
Mercosur level will enable party members to implement common tariffs
and coordinate liberalization plans.131 Many spill-over benefits should occur from a coordination of telecommunications policies on a regional basis,
such as increased cross-border trade and investments. In addition, a coordinated effort between the four Mercosur governments will have a positive
impact on the ability for telecommunications companies to coordinate
plans, build alliances and create a strong union when negotiating settlement
rates with Unites States providers.1 32 The creation of a strong regional organization lends itself well to the coordination of a telecommunications
policy among the Mercosur members and will serve to bolster economic
and business development to Argentina and the Mercosur region.
C. Enforce Quality and Technological Standards Recommended by
International and Domestic Regulatory Bodies
The Argentine government should enforce the quality recommendations and technological standards for the telecommunications industry created by ITU and the CNC. All competitors should have access to
transparent procedures that are issued or endorsed by governmental
authorities. Transparent procedures provide all the relevant information regarding administrative procedures or other133requirements that must be adhered to by the countries within the market.
In other words, the standards
must be clear and accessible so that current and future market investors can
understand and comply with the international and domestic standards and
recommendations.
The Argentine government or a government agency should also create
a compliance system to check market investors' adherence to the related
international and domestic telecommunications standards. It is critical that
all investors within the telecommunications market are regulated on a systematic and periodic basis. Furthermore, in order to create a fair and competitive environment, it is important that all telecommunications
129 See Tarijanne, supra note 93.
30
See id.
131 See Katz & Alexander Dichter, supra note 105, at 1, 10.
132See id.
133 TelecommunicationsSymposium, supra note 5, at 975.
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participants are required to comply with the same technological and quality
standards. If certain market participants are given special exemptions, new
market investors will not be able to compete effectively and artificial barriers to entry will deter future competitors from entering the market.
V. CONCLUSION

Argentina has made progress in its attempt to liberalize its telecommunications industry for basic services over the past ten years by privatizing
the industry, creating legislation attempting to fully liberalize the market
and establishing a regulatory body. Notwithstanding these efforts, Argentina has missed several opportunities to accelerate the opening of a competitive market and in some instances has even taken steps to undermine the
liberalization process by preventing or restricting competitors access to the
market. In essence, Argentina undermines its stated commitment to liberalization with legislation containing restrictive or discriminatory provisions
serving to impose obstacles for competitors to enter the market, thereby
delaying the start of a competitive telecommunications market.
By departing from its practices in the past, Argentina has the potential
to become a leader in Latin America and take bold steps to fully liberalize
its telecommunications industry. Argentina must improve or create new
legislation ensuring the complete liberalization of its telecommunications
industry and even more importantly, it must consistently uphold its domestic rule of law and honor its international commitments to liberalization.
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